Chapter 3 of 3 · 10 min

Preferred equity: preference and participation

First claim on the downside, a share of the upside. Where converting beats the preference, and what participation costs the common.

By the end of this chapter you can
  • Decide whether non-participating preferred converts or takes its preference
  • Calculate participating preferred's proceeds and what it costs the common
  • Find the exit value at which the investor converts
  • Explain why a minority investor asks for a preference
1

The intuition

You lend a friend $100 toward a food truck in return for 40% of whatever it sells for one day, with a promise: if it sells for less than it should, you get your $100 back first. If it sells for a lot, 40% is worth more than $100 and you take that instead. You can choose, and you choose whichever is bigger.

That is non-participating preferred equity with a 1x liquidation preference. A tougher version, participating preferred, does not choose: it takes the $100 back and then 40% of what is left as well. Founders call it double-dipping.

The key idea

Non-participating = the larger of the preference and ownership × exit. Participating = preference + ownership × (exit − preference). Conversion point = preference ÷ ownership.

2

Why it works

  • The conventions here: one class of preferred held by the investor, convertible into a stated share of the common, and no debt. Participation is uncapped. The founders and management hold the common and get whatever is left.
  • The preference is a multiple of the money invested, usually 1x, paid before the common sees anything.
  • Below the preference the investor takes the whole exit and the common gets nothing.
  • Between the preference and the conversion point, non-participating preferred takes its preference, and the common absorbs the whole shortfall, even though it owns most of the shares.
  • Above the conversion point non-participating preferred converts and everyone shares pro rata, as if there were no preference.
  • Participation always pays at least as much as non-participating. Once the investor would have converted, the extra it takes is the preference × (1 − ownership), for ever, unless there is a cap.
$100M invested; 1x preference; converts into 40% of the common
Conversion point: 100 ÷ 40%250
Exit 80: below the preferenceInvestor takes all 80; common gets nothing
Exit 200: 100 against 40% × 200 = 80Takes the preference, 100; common gets 100 for 60% of the shares
Exit 400: 100 against 40% × 400 = 160Converts, 160; common gets 240
Participating at 400: 100 + 40% × 300220, costing the common 60

60 = 100 × (1 − 40%): the participation premium above the conversion point.

3

The formulas

Preference = preference multiple × investment

Paid back first.

As converted = ownership × exit equity

The investor's share if it converts.

Non-participating = the larger of preference and as converted (at most the exit)

It chooses.

Participating = preference + ownership × (exit − preference)

It takes both.

Conversion point = preference ÷ ownership

Where converting matches the preference.

4

Worked example

Work out the preference and the as-converted share, and take the larger.

Drawing the numbers…
5

See it move

Same investment. Change the investor's ownership, the size of the preference and the exit.

Drawing the numbers…
Try this
  • Raise the exit. The investor's proceeds never fall: everything up to the preference, then the preference, then its converted share.
  • Raise the ownership. The conversion point falls: converting pays sooner.
  • Raise the preference. The conversion point rises, and the common absorbs the shortfall over a wider range of exits.
  • Push the exit past the conversion point. The participation premium stops growing and stays at the preference × (1 − ownership).
6

Run it backwards

Same investment, reversed: above what exit value does the investor convert instead of taking the preference?

Drawing the numbers…

Converting pays ownership × exit; the preference pays a fixed amount. They are equal where exit = preference ÷ ownership.

It tells you whether the structure is protection or a price cut. If the sponsor's base case is well above the conversion point, the preference only matters in the downside; if not, the common is giving up value in the expected outcome.

7

Traps

Adding the preference and the converted share for non-participating preferred.
It chooses one: the larger. Only participating preferred takes both.
Splitting the exit pro rata below the conversion point.
The investor takes its preference and the common absorbs the shortfall.
Paying a preference larger than the exit.
The investor can take at most the whole exit; below the preference the common gets nothing.
Calculating participation on the whole exit.
The share applies to what is left after the preference.
Calling a 1x preference harmless.
It decides who bears the first loss, and preferences from several rounds stack.
8

Say it in the interview

The interviewer asks

Explain the difference between participating and non-participating preferred.

Say yours out loud first, then compare.
9

Check yourself

4 fresh questions, with new numbers. Answer each one correctly to finish the chapter. Get one wrong and you will see the full working, then you can try it again with new numbers.

Answers within 1% are marked right. Type the number; $, %, x and M are fine. First tries count toward Learned: the topic is Learned once every chapter is done and 75% of first tries were right.

0 of 4
Drawing your questions…
Remember
  • Non-participating = the larger of the preference and ownership × exit.
  • Participating = preference + ownership × (exit − preference).
  • Conversion point = preference ÷ ownership.
  • Below it, the common absorbs the shortfall.